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MILITARY LAW-SERVICE DISCHARGE-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISCHARGE 
CussIFICATIONs-In 1954 petitioners were discharged from the Army in 
form other than "honorable." Petitioner Harmon had previously been 
questioned by Army officials regarding alleged Communist affiliations. Since 
most of the charges against him were based on conduct antedating his induc-
tion into the Army and since his military record had been "excellent," peti-
tioner Harmon was informed that he would not be discharged as disloyal or 
subversive pursuant to Army regulations,1 but would be retained in his 
then present grade, assigned nonsensitive duties, and given a discharge 
at the end of his career appropriate to the character of the service he had 
rendered. Issuance of Directive 5210.9 shortly thereafter by the Secretary 
of Defense,2 which applied to military personnel the criteria of the 
1 Army Reg. 615-370 (1950) authorizes the issuance of an undesirable discharge, inter 
alia, to one found to be disloyal or subversive. 
2 Executive Order 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), as amended by Executive Order 
10491, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583 (1953). The directive stipulated that the standard for retention 
in the armed services would be "that on all available information it is determined that 
the . . . retention is clearly consistent with the interests of national security." Until 
recently the Army's policy under the program to prevent infiltration of security risks 
into its ranks had been to induct individuals despite a questionable security status, but 
the present program as embodied in the June 1956 amendment to Army Reg. 604-10 
provides for more extensive screening of inductees. 
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civilian security program, resulted in review of petitioner Harmon's case 
and his discharge as undesirable. While the record is not clear, petitioner 
Abramowitz apparently was discharged as undesirable under similar 
circumstances.8 After exhausting administrative remedies,4 petitioners 
brought suit seeking a declaration that their discharges were void and an 
order that the discharges be changed to honorable. Concluding that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the action, the district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Army,5 and the court of appeals 
affirmed.6 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, re-
versed, one justice dissenting. In a per curiam opinion the Court ruled 
that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether the Secretary 
of the Army had exceeded his statutory authority in basing the discharge 
classification on conduct antedating induction, and petitioners had stand-
ing to bring this action. On the merits, the secretary may consider only a 
soldier's military record; hence the secretary's action was in excess of his 
statutory authority and the case should be remanded to the district 
court for relief to petitioners. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). 
A serviceman has a substantial interest in the classification of his 
discharge since in addition to the social stigma involved, a veteran who 
receives an undesirable discharge suffers direct pecuniary injury through 
denial of state and federal benefits and private and government employ-
ment.7 Statutory authority to prescribe conditions under which a soldier 
shall be discharged is vested in the Secretary of the Army.8 A series of Army 
regulations establishes five categories of discharges and describes the 
circumstances under which they shall be given.9 Congress created the 
8 There is apparently no report of the Abramowitz case in the District Court for 
the District of Columbia. The cases were consolidated on certiorari. 
4 Petitioner Harmon initially appealed to the Army Discharge Review Board, but 
application to have his discharge changed was denied following a hearing. Subsequent 
application to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records was also denied. 
Direct request to the Secretary of the Army for the award of an honorable discharge 
resulted in referral of the case to the Board for Correction, and the secretary accepted 
the Board's recommendation against changing the discharge classification. 
5 Harmon v. Brucker, (D.C. D.C. 1956) 137 F. Supp. 475. See also note 3 supra. 
6 Harmon v. Brucker, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 613; Abramowitz v. Brucker, (D.C. 
Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 834. After the decision in the district court the Army Discharge 
Review Board reviewed petitioner Harmon's case, changing the character of the discharge 
from undesirable to general under honorable conditions. The secretary's suggestion that 
the case ,had thereby become moot was rejected by the court of appeals. 
7 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §21 (employment preferences provided for honorably 
discharged veterans); N.Y. 'Educ. Law §§608 to 609 (scholarships provided for honorably 
discharged veterans); Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 614 (1948), as 
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §459(b) (employment preferences provided for honorably 
discharged veterans). See also Schustack v. Herren, (2d Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 134 at 135, 
n. 1. 
8 41 Stat. 809 (1921), as amended, IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §3811. 
9 The five categories for enlisted men are: honorable, general (under honorable con-
ditions), undesirable (under other than honorable conditions), bad conduct, and dis-
honorable. 
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. Army Review Board to review discharge classifications, providing that 
its findings shall be final subject only to review by the secretary of the 
service involved.10 On the basis of these statutes, the secretary contended 
that the administrative procedure is exclusive and that the clear con-
gressional intent inferable from the language of finality in the statutes 
precluded judicial review. In seeking to avoid the constitutional issues 
raised by petitioners pertaining to an alleged denial of due process of law 
and lack of judicial trial, the Court confined its decision to a determination 
of the nature and extent of the secretary's statutory authority. Reference 
was made to Army regulations which indicate that a discharge classification 
is to be based on the character of service rendered during the period 
covered by the discharge,11 and to a statute providing for military review 
based upon "all available records" of the Army.12 It was concluded that 
judicial review is necessary to insure adherence to such standards, and 
that the discharge classification is to be determined from "all available 
records of military service."13 Thus the secretary had exceeded his authority 
in basing petitioners' discharges in part on conduct antedating their 
induction into the Army.14 
Aside from congressional intent to preclude review inferable from 
the language of finality in the statute, the rationale supporting a policy 
of non-reviewability of discharge classifications appears to be twofold: 
first, the doctrine of separation of powers dictates that the military, a 
specialized community with its own unique disciplinary standards, be given 
unfettered discretion in the administration of its personnel; and second, 
granting judicial review of such matters would impose an appalling bur-
den on the federal courts. Until the decision in the principal case, however, 
the Supreme Court had expressly left open the question of reviewability 
of administrative discharge classifications.15 While in several recent cases 
lower federal courts have held that there could be no review,16 these may 
be interpreted as merely narrowing the scope of review since questions of 
10 58 Stat. 286 (1944), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §693h. By 60 Stat. 837 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) 
§19l(a), the Secretary of the Army is empowered to create a Board to Correct Military 
Records, to which petitioners applied in the course of their review. 
11Army Regs. 615-375(2)(b) and 615-360(7) (1951). 
12 58 Stat. 286 (1944), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §693h. 
13 In the course of his dissent Justice Clark argued that the majority's construction 
of "all available records" to mean solely those relating to petitioners' military record, 
thus reading "all" to mean "some," was "lacking of any justification." Principal case at 585. 
14 It should be pointed out that the Solicitor General conceded that if the district 
court had jurisdiction to review the case and petitioners had standing to raise the ques-
tion, the secretary's action was not sustainable. 
15 Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U.S. 539 at 542 (1947). 
16 Gentila v. Pace, (D.C. Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 924 at 927, cert. den. 342 U.S. 943 
(1952); Bernstein v. Herren, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 78 at 80, affd. (2d Cir. 1956) 
234 F. (2d) 434, cert. den. 352 U.S. 840 (1956). Contra, Levin v. Gillespie, (N.D. Cal. 1954) 
121 F. Supp. 726, order vacated on amendment of statute, Civil No. 33574, March 24, 1955. 
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fact were involved.17 In its hesitancy to interpret a statute as denying 
all review, the Supreme Court has construed similar finality clauses as 
merely limiting the scope of review.18 Indeed, a study of the cases dem-
onstrates that the law of reviewability is governed more by general policy 
factors than a normal judicial inquiry into the legislative intent.19 More-
over, there is precedent supporting judicial review when the military has 
exceeded its statutory authority.20 While it may be argued that provision 
for adequate administrative review should permit the military to have 
otherwise unrestrained power to determine discharge classifications, when 
statutory standards for determination of the proper type of discharge 
have clearly been ignored the check provided by limited judicial review 
strengthens the administrative process. It is open to question, however, 
whether in order to avoid a consideration of constitutional issues by 
ruling on the basis of statutory authority, the Court should indulge in 
dubious statutory construction.21 
Edward M. Heppenstall 
17 See Gentila v. Pace, note 16 supra. But see Bernstein v. Herren, note 16 supra. 
The Gentila case, relied on by both lower courts in the principal case, seems to be au-
thority only for a refusal to review an allegedly erroneous finding of fact. 
18 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). 
19 See Davis, "Unreviewable Administrative Action," 15 F.R.D. 411 at 414 (1954): 
"The most important forces are the reactions of judges to reviewing or refraining from 
reviewing particular questions in particular cases." 
20 Denby v. Berry, (D.C. Cir. 1922) 279 F. 317, revd. on other grounds, 263 U.S. 29 
(1923). However, Justice Clark stated, "At no time until today have the courts interfered 
in the exercise of this military function." Principal case, dissenting opinion, at 584. 
21 See note 13 supra. 
